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INTERPRETING THE FEDERAL
TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT OF 1995: THE
LOGIC OF THE ACTUAL DILUTION
REQUIREMENT
Abstract: The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 creates a cause
of action for trademark dilution. lu contrast to trademark infringement
law, which requires a showing of consumer confusion about the source
or affiliation of goods and services, dilution law protects the distinctive
quality and selling power of the trademark itself, even if consumers are
not confused. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, emphasizing the
statute's requirement that the defendant's trademark "causes dilution"
of the distinctive quality of an established trademark, has required
evidence of•an actual diminution of the established trademark's selling
power. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has read the statute to
require just a likelihood of dilution, and has held that circumstantial
evidence of probable dilution is enough to prove a violation. This Note
argues that the Fourth Circuit's interpretation is more consistent with
the text of the statute and with the public interest in trademark law.
INTRODUCTION
Trademarks are essential tools of the consumer in a mass society.'
The existence of trademark law enables the consumer to take for
granted that a restaurant bearing the MCDONALD'S trademark is
affiliated with previous MCDONALD'S restaurants she has eaten at,
which makes it possible to predict the quality of the food with great
accuracy. 2
 If competitors could use trademarks confusingly similar to
MCDONALD'S, the consumer would not be sure what to expect. 3
Trademarks also work to the advantage of their owners, for the
selling power of established trademarks functions as a partial barrier
against the entry of new products into the market. 4
 If consumers pre-
fer products bearing established tradeniarks to products of equal
quality selling at a lower price (or higher quality at the same price),
I See Robert N. Klieger, Trademath Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for
Trademark Protection, 58 U. Priv. L. REv. 789,853-56 (1997).
2 See id.
3 See id.
a See id. at 856-60.
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new products could be forced out of the market because of the often
non-rational appeal of established trademarks. 5 If consumers prefer
for such reasons to eat at MCDONALD'S rather than JOE'S, despite
the fact that JOE'S offers a better deal, the power of the MCDON-
ALD'S trademark could force JOE'S out of business. 6 This would not
be in the interest of consumers. 7
The prevention of consumer confusion has been the traditional
basis of trademark protection in the United States. 8 Under federal
law, a trademark infringement claim requires a showing that the defen-
dant's mark is likely to confuse consumers about the source or
affiliation of its goods or services.° In 1995, however, Congress en-
acted the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (the "FTDA"), creating a
federal cause of action for trademark dilution. 1 ° Dilution is defined as
"the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distin-
guish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of .. .
[a] likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception?" In contrast to
infringement law, which is based on a theory of consumer protection,
dilution law is concerned with protecting the "distinctive quality" of
the trademark itself, even if consumers have not been deceived or
misled." The FTDA therefore has the potential to disconnect trade-
mark law from its foundation in consumer protection and to re-
configure it on the model of a property right in gross."
Proponents of dilution law argue that trademark owners are enti-
tled to protect their investment in the selling power of their mark
even if there is no consumer confusion . to combat." Critics, however,
believe dilution law grants established trademark owners too great a
zone of exclusivity and a property right that has no clear boundaries."
See id. in 858-59.
6 See Klieger, supra note I, at 858-59.
7 See id.
8 See Robert C. Denicola, Tim/marks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerging
Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 Wis. L. R.E.r. 158, 160 (1982).
See J. THONIAS NICCARTIM NICCARTHV ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
2:03 (4th ed. 1999).
i" Pub. L. No. 104-98. 109 Stat. 985 (1996) (codified at Lanham Act 43(c), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(c) (1994 & Stipp. 1996)).
11 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
12 See Klieger. supra note 1, at 793-94.
13•See id. at 865.
14 See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1993: Hearing on H.R. 1293 and H.R. 1270 Before
the House judiciary Comm. Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property (testimony of Nils Vic-
tor Montan) reprinted in Federal News Service, _July 19, 1995.
15 See Kenneth L. Port, The 'Unnatural" Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a Federal Dilu-
tion Statute Necessary?, 18 SETON I IALL LECIS. J. 433, 448-49 (1994). 	 •
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With this dispute over the merits of dilution theory in the back-
ground, the courts have advanced conflicting readings of the FTDA. 16
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the statutory text,
which requires proof that the defendant's mark "causes dilution" of
the distinctive quality of an established trademark, demands evidence
of actual dilution of the senior mark's selling power." The Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, however, has read the FTDA to require just a
likelihood of dilution, and has held that circumstantial evidence of
probable dilution is enough to prove a violation. 18
 This Note argues
that the Fourth Circuit is correct in reading the statute to require
proof of actual dilution. 19
 The Second Circuit's contrary interpreta-
tion is inconsistent with the statutory text, is unpredictable in its ap-
plication, and does not advance the public interest in trademark pro-
tection. 2°
Section I of this Note outlines the scope and the limits of the
public interest in trademark protection. Section II examines the ori-
gins and the evolution of dilution law in the United States. Section III
describes the FTDA and summarizes early interpretations of the stat-
ute in the courts, Sections IV and V discuss the Fourth Circuit's deci-
sion in Ringling and the Second Circuit's decision in Nabisco. Section
VI argues that the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the FTDA is more
consistent with the text of the statute and with the public in terest.
I. THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN TRADEMARK PROTECTION
Why does American law protect trademarks? To supporters of the
federal dilution statute, trademark owners have a right to enjoin rep-
licating or near-replicating uses of their marks that is analogous to the
right of landowners to enjoin trespass. 21 In hearings on the FTDA, a
Warner Brothers executive explained to a House committee: It] he
basic principle is that the trademark owner, who has spent the time
and investment needed to create and maintain the property, should
be the sole determinant of how that property is to be used in a coin-
16 See infra notes 163-204 and accompanying text.
17 See Ringling Bros. Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Dev., 170 F3d 449,458 (4th Cir. 1999).
to See Nabisco, Inc. v. ['F Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208,217-22 (2d Cir. 1999).
' 9 See infra notes 163-190 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 191.-204 and accompanying text.
21
 See Federal nadentadt Dilution Act of 1995: Hearing on 11.11. 1295 and 11.1t 1270 Before
the HouseJudiciwy COMM. Subconamon Courts and Intellectual Properly (testimony of Nils Victor
Montan) reprinted in Federal News Service, July 19,1995.
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inertial manner:22 This is the property-right-in-gross view of trade-
mark ownership."
Such a formulation is in tension with the traditional justification
for trademark protection in the United States, which is based not on
the interests of the trademark owner, but on the interests of consum-
ers in the marketplace. 24 While copyright and patent law are con-
cerned with setting up incentives to create, trademark infringement
law aims to prevent sellers from misleading consumers about the
source and affiliation of goods and services.25 This helps consumers
make decisions based on their past experience with specific brands. 26
The concern of infringement law is not with the owner of the trade-
mark itself, but with the consumer who is "duped into dealing with an
imposter:27 Indeed, the trademark infringement plaintiff has been
described as the "'vicarious avenger' of consumer interests." 28
The benefit of trademark protection for consumers, however,
comes at a potential cost." Trademarks create barriers to the entry of
new products into the market, to the extent that established trade-
marks succeed in luring consumers away from new products bearing
unfamiliar marks." Trademarks have this effect by virtue of their role
"as vessels through which all forms of advertising, ... must pass."m To
the extent that the lure of an advertised trademark is based not on the
tangible qualities of the goods or services it identifies, but on an in-
tangible "brand personality ... aimed at the consumer's heart rather
than his tor her] mind,"" new and perhaps better and/or cheaper
products could be forced out of the market by the non-rational per-
suasive power of established trademarks."
In 1942, in Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Manufacturing Co. v. S.S.
Kresge Co., the Supreme Court noted the non-rational aspect of
trademark-driven consumer behavior:
22 See id.
23 See Klieger, supra note 1, at 851.
24 See id at 853-56.
23 See id.
26 See id.
27 Denicola, supra note 8, at 160. Denicola writes that It] he law of trademarks and un-
fair competition has its roots ill the common law action of deceit." Id.
sn N1cCARTItv, supra note 9,2:33 (citation omitted).
26 See Demicula, supra note 8, at 183; Klieger, supra note 1, at 856-60.
31} SeeDetficola, supra note 8, at 183; Klieger, supra note 1, at 856-60.
Klieger,.supra note 1, at 856.
32 Id. at 857.
33 See id. at 858-59.
December 2000]	 Federal Trademark Dilution Ad of 1995 	 211
If it is true that we live by symbols, it is no less true that we
purchase goods by them.. A trademark is a merchandising
short-cut which induces a purchaser to select what he wants,
or what he has been led to believe he wants. The owner of a mark
exploits this human propensity by making every effort to
impregnate the atmosphere of the market with the drawing
power of a congenial symbol . . . . 34
Product differentiation based on, non-rational appeals to artificial de-
sires "not only enables a company to charge a premium for its goods
relative to the identical gOods of another producer, it enables the
company to keep other producers out of the market." 35
 This cannot
be good for the consumer. 36
The consumer confusion test aims to strike a balance between
the socially desirable function of trademarks in facilitating market
competition and informed consumer decision making, and the social
costs of trademarks just described, protecting trademarks to the ex-
tent required to prevent consumer confusion and encourage compe-
tition, but not beyond that point. 37
 The Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals has stated that "[a] tradeniark owner has a property right [in
the trademark] only insofar as is necessary to prevent consumer con-
fusion as to who produced the goods and to facilitate differentiation
of the ... goods."38
 It was out of dissatisfaction with this assumption
about the interests trademark law protects that dilution theory
emerged."
H. THE ORIGINS OF DILUTION LAW
Dilution theory originated in Frank I. Schechter's 1927 Harvard
Law Review article The Rational Basis of Trademark Proteetion.40 Schech-
ter criticized the consumer protection model of trademark law, argu-
ing instead that "the preservation of the uniqueness of a trademark
... constitute [s] the only rational basis for its protection." 41 The "real
injury" that concerned Schechter was not the confusion of the con-
"316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942) (emphasis added).
" Klieger, SUM note 1, at 859.
36 See id.
37 See hi. at 851-63.
38 Int'l Order of job's Daughter v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 1980).
39 See infra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
4" See Frank 1. Schechter, The Rational Basis of nademark Protection, 40 HAWS% L. REV. 813
(1927).
41 Id. at 831.
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sumer who might be misled, but an injury to the value of the trade-
mark itself, which he described as "the gradual whittling away or dis-
persion of the identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark or
name by its use upon non-competing goods?" .Schechter offered an
illustrative example:
[W. "Kodak" may be used for bath tubs and cakes, "Mazda"
for cameras and shoes, or "Ritz-Carlton" for coffee, these
marks must inevitably be lost in the commonplace words of
the language, despite the originality and ingenuity in their
contrivance, and the vast expenditures in advertising them
which should be protected to the same extent as plant and
machinery."
Schechter suggested that the real power of a trademark rested not on
its source signification function, but rather on its pure "selling power,"
which depended in turn on its "uniqueness and singularity."'" Schech-
ter's insight, in sum, was that the selling power of a trademark could
be injured even in the absence of consumer confusion, via "whittling
away" or "dispersion" of its distinctive quality and its hold on the pub-
lic."
For an infringement claim to succeed, the 1905 Trademark Act
required that the goods in question have the "same descriptive prop-
erties."46 Under the 1905 Act, the Kodak bathtubs Schechter hypothe-
sized could not be enjoined with an infringement action, even if con-
sumers held the mistaken belief that the camera company was
associated with the bathtubs, because cameras and bathtubs do not
have the same descriptive properties. 47 Although the 1946 Lanham
Act (revising federal trademark law) did not include the dilution
cause of action Schechter had advocated, it eliminated the "same de-
scriptive properties" requirement."
42 Id. at 825.
43 Id. at 830. The new cause of action Schechter proposed would not have applied to
all trademarks, but would have been limited to "coined, arbitrary or fanciful words or
phrases that have been added to rather than withdrawn from the human vocabulary." Id. at
829. The FIDA does not include this limitation.
44 See Schechter, sepia note 40, at 831.
45 See id. at 825.
See Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 5 (b), 33 Stat. 724, 725 (repealed 1946),
47 See id.	 .
48 See Lanham Act, ch. 540, §§ 2(d), 32, 60 Stat. 427, 428, 437-38 (1946). As Judge
Learned Hand explained in Yale Electric CorP. v. Robertson, au influential 1928 opinion that
anticipated the demise of the "same descriptive properties" requirement: "[Al merchant.
may have a sufficient economic interest in the use of his mark outside the field of his own
December 2000)	 Federal Timid/lath Dilution Ad of 1995
	 213
With the elimination of the "same descriptive properties" re-
quirement, much of what had concerned Schechter was addressed: it
was now possible to sue for trademark infringement against uses on
non-competing products. 49
 For example, the use of PEPSI on shovels
could be enjoined if some consumers would mistakenly believe the
junior use was connected with the senior use, despite the absence of
competition between soda and ,shovels. 5° In the leading treatise on
American trademark law, J. Thomas McCarthy writes, "The modern
rule of [infringement] law gives the trademark owner protection
against use of its mark on any product or service which would rea-
sonably he thought by the buying public to come from the same
source, or thought to be affiliated with, connected with, or sponsored
by, the trademark owner. "51
Despite the Lanham Act's elimination of the requirement that
goods be in competition with each other for a trademark infringe-
ment action to succeed, Massachusetts enacted the first state dilution
statute the next year in 1947, which provided that "[l]ikelihood of in-
jury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of a
trade name or trade-mark shall be a ground for injunctive relief ...
notwithstanding the absence of competition between the parties or of
confusion as to the source of goods or services."52
 Between 1947 and
1964, Illinois, New York, Georgia and Connecticut enacted dilution
statutes." In 1964 the United States Trademark Association put a dilu-
tion clause into its Model State Trademark Bill, and in subsequent
years "state after state incorporated the language of the Model Bill
exploitation to justify interposition by a court. His mark is his authetuic seal; by it lie
vouches for the goods which hear it; it carries his name for good or ill. If another uses it,
he burrows the owner's reputation, whose quality no hinger lies within his own control.
'lids is an injury, even though the borrower does not tarnish it, or divert any sales by its
use; for a reputation, like a face, is the symbol of its possessor and creator, and another can
use it only as a mask." 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928)
"See Klieger, sepia note I, at 808.
5° See id.
51 MCCARTHY, supra note 9, 24:6.
52 See Act Authorizing Injunctive Relief in Certain Cases of Trade-Mark Infringement
or Unfair Competition, ch. 307, 1947 Mass. Acts 300 (current version at MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. Ch. 110B, § 12 (West 1996)).
53 See Act Concerning Trademarks and Service Marks, §9(c), 1963 Conn. Acts 99, 105
(current version at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 35-11i(c) (1997)); Act of March 4, 1955, 1955 Ca.
Laws 453,,454 § 1 (current version at GA. Corn: ANN. § 10--1-451(5) (1994)); Act of June
24, 1953, § 1, 1953 III. Laws. 455, 456 (current version at 765 ILL. Cow. S'rvi'. ANN.
1036/65 (West 1993 & Stipp. 1999)); Act of Apr. 18, 1955, ch. 453, § 1, 1955 N.Y. Laws
1127, 1127 (current version at N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 368-d (McKinney 2000)).
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into its trademark law."54 The Model State Trademark Bill reads:
"Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the dis-
tinctive quality of a mark registered under this Act, or a mark valid at
common law, or a trade name valid at common law, shall be a ground
for injunctive relief notwithstanding the absence of competition be-
tween the parties or the absence of confusion as to the source of
goods or services."55
The courts, however, were unenthusiastic about the dilution stat-
utes.56 Some courts, notwithstanding statutory 'declarations that con-
sumer confusion was not required, rejected dilution claims because
consumer confusion had not been demonstrated." Other courts held
dilution statutes inapplicable in cases of direct competition between
the parties. 58 Still others were concerned about the potential impact
of the dilution statutes on the overall balance of trademark law. 59 In
1969, in Coffee Dan's, Inc. v. Coffee Don's Charcoal Broiler, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California rejected a
claim under California's dilution statute that COFFEE DON'S
CHARCOAL BROILER, used in connection with a restaurant, diluted
COFFEE DAN'S, also used in connection with eating establishments.°
The court wrote: "Until [the California dilution] statute is interpreted
more fully by a California court, we feel constrained not to give it
overly broad application lest it swallow up all competition in the claim
of protection against trade name infringement." 61 The court was hesi-
tant, in other words, to create a property right in trademarks extend-
ing beyond what was required to prevent consumer confusion. 62
A 1976 commentary concluded that the dilution cause of action
"largely has been ignored by the courts despite the plain dictates of
51 Klieger, supra note 1, at 813.
55
 MODEL STATE TRADEMARK Btu. 12 (U.S. Trademark Association 1964) reprinted in
McCARTHY, supra note 9, 24:80.
56 See infin notes 58-72 and accompanying text.
57 See, e.g., King Research, Inc. v. Sim1ton, Inc., 324 F. Stipp. 631, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);
Cue Pubrg, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 256 N.Y.S.2d 239, 295 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), affil, 259
N.Y.S.2d 377 (N.): App. Div. 1965) ("It would appear therefore, and the cases have so held,
that to give effect to the dilution doctrine some measure of confusion must be present.").
58 See, e.g., EZ Loader Boat Trailers. Inc. v. Cox Trailers, Inc. 746 F.2d 375, 380 (7th Cir.
1984) ("the Illinois Courts have consistently held that the protections of the Anti-Dilution
Statute are unavailable to competitors"); Alberto-Culver Co. v. Andrea Dumon, Inc., 466
F.2d 705, 709 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding Illinois dilution statute inapplicable to competing
products).
59 See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
6° See 305 F. Stipp. 1210, 1217-18 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
61 See Coffee Dan's, 305 F. Stipp. at 1217 n.13.
62
 See id,; see also Klieger, supra note 1, at 816.
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the statutes . • ."63 The Restatement (Third) on Unfair Competition ex-
plains the reluctance of courts to venture beyond the premises of in-
fringement theory to sanction dilution claims:
Some courts, and numerous commentators, expressed fear
that the uncertain limits of the antidilution cause of action
would unduly expand the ability of trademark owners to
monopolize language and inhibit free competition. A broad
antidilution theory also has the potential to render su-
perfluous the traditional likelihood of confusion standard of
liability. 64
McCarthy writes that the "subtlety of the injury caused by dilution"
contributed to judicial reluctance to enforce the state statutes, and
that judges have found dilution "not an easy concept to understand or
explain."65
 Because of this, state dilution statutes fell into disuse. 66
In the late 1970s, however, some courts began to reconsider their
reluctance to enforce dilution statutes. 67 In 1977, in Allied Maintenance
Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., the New York Court of Appeals
criticized the general trend of non-enforcement. 68
 In an influential
dictum, the court described dilution as "a cancer-like growth of dis-
similar products or services which feeds upon the business reputation
of an established distinctive trademark or name."69 Although the
court concluded on the facts of the case that the plaintiff's mark
lacked the requisite distinctiveness to qualify for dilution protection,
it painted the dilution cause of action in broad strokes."
"Beverly, W. Patfishall, The Dilution Rationale for Trademark-Trade Identity Protection, Its
Progress and Prospects, 71 Nw. U. L. Ray. 618. 621 (1976); see also kfieger, supra note 1, at
815-819; Port, supra note 15, at 439.
64
 RESTATEMENT CFI II RD) ON UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25, cult. b (1995).
65 See MCCARTF .supra note 9, 24:100,
66 See id.
67 See infix notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
68 See 369 N.E.2d 1162, 1165-66 (N.Y. 1977).
69 Allied Maintenance, 369 N.E.2d at 1165.
7° Id. Specifically, the court held,
It would he of no significance under our statute that Tiffany's Movie Theater
is not a competitor of, nor likely to he confused with Tiffany's jewelry. The
harm that [the New York dilution minute] is designed to prevent is the grad-
ual whittling away of a firm's dim inctive trademark or name. II is not difficult
to imagine the possible effect which the proliferation of various noncompeti-
tive businesses utilizing the name Tiffany's would have upon the public's as-
sociation of the name Tiffany's solely with fine jewelry. The ultimate effect.
has been appropriately , termed dilin io
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In subsequent years some courts heeded the advice of the New York
court and stepped up their enforcement of state dilution laws." But
the magnitude of the trend should not be overstated; one study con-
cluded that as of 1996 courts had granted relief on state dilution-law
grounds alone in just sixteen cases.72
Ill. THE FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT
Against this background of ineffective state dilution legislation, it
is easy to understand why proponents of enhanced trademark protec-
tion—with the International Trademark Association leading the
charge—pursued a federal dilution statute. 73 An effort to insert a dilu-
tion clause into the Lanham Act passed the Senate in 1988, but failed
in the House. 74 Seven years later, however, very similar legislation
"passed rapidly through Congress with minimal hearings in the House
and none in the Senate." 75 The Federal Trademark Dilution Act was
signed into law and went into effect on January 16, 1996. 76
The purpose of the FTDA was "to protect famous trademarks
from subsequent uses that blur the distinctiveness of the mark or tar-
nish or disparage it, even in the absence of a likelihood of confu-
sion."77 The House Report offered DUPONT shoes, BUICK aspirin
and KODAK pianos to illustrate the concept of trademark dilution. 78
A federal cause of action was said to be needed, despite the existence
of the state statutes, to reduce the incentives for forum-shopping that
reliance on state law created and to ensure that injunctions would
have nationwide effect." Congress also asserted that federal dilution
Id.
71 See, e.g., Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Celozzi-Ettelson
Chevrolet, Inc., 855 F.2d 480, 485 (7th Cir. 1988); Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Serv., 736 F.2d
1153, 1158 (7th Cir. 1984); Community Fed. Say. & Loan Assoc. v. Orondorff, 678 F.2d
1034, 1037 (11th Cir. 1982).
72 Klieger, supra note 1, at 820.
73 See 14 'Ida J. Oswald, "Tarnishmenl" and "Blurring" Under the Federal Trademark Dilution
Ad of 1995, 36 Am. Bus. L.J. 255, 268 (1999). The VIDA "was the result of an intense and
lengthy lobbying effort led by the International Trademark Association." Id.
71 See	 supra note 9. 24:86.
75 See id.
78 Ser 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1094 & Stipp. 1996).
77 H.R. REP. No. 104-374 at 2 (1905).
78 Id. at 3.
79 See id. at 3-4. The House Report stated that federal legislation to protect famous
trademarks against dilution was needed because "famous marks ordinarily are used on a
nationwide basis and dilution protection is currently only available on a patch-quilt system
of protection, in that only approximately 25 slates have laws that prohibit trademark dilu-
tion." See id. at 3.
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protection for famous marks was required under the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), an
element of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Trade
and Tariffs (GATT), to which the United States was a signatory."
The FTDA protects "famous" trademarks against dilution of their
"distinctive quality":
The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the
principles of equity and upon such terms as the court deems
reasonable, to an injunction against another person's com-
mercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such
use begins after the mark has become famous and causes di-
lution of the distinctive quality of the mark . . , 81
Dilution is defined as "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark
to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the pres-
ence or absence of (1) competition between the owner of the famous
mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or
deception."82 The statute also lists eight non-exclusive factors for
courts to weigh in deciding if 'a trademark is "distinctive and fa-
mous. "83
In sum, the elements of a federal dilution claim are (1) the plain-
tiff owns a fatuous trademark; (2) the defendant's use is commercial
and in interstate commerce; (3) the defendant's use commenced of
 the plaintiff's mark had achieved its fame; and (4) the defendant's
use lessens the capacity of the plaintiff's mark to identify and distin-
guish goods and services. 84
One major difference between the federal and state dilution
statutes is the FTDA's requirement that the mark be famous. 83 Courts
have had some difficulties interpreting the famousness requirement,
88 Id. at 4.
81 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1) (1994 & Stipp, 1996).
82 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
83 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1) (A)—(H). The factors are (A) the degree of inherent or ac-
quired distinctiveness of the mark; (B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in con-
nection with the goods or services with which the mark is used; (C) the duration and ex-
tent of advertising and publicity of the mark; (0) the geographical extent of the trading
area in which the mark is used; (E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with
which the mark is used; (F) the degree of recognition for the mark in the trading areas
and channels of trade used by the mark's owner and the person against whom the Mimic-
lion is sought; (G) time nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by Third par-
ties; and (H) whether the mark was registered under [federal law]. Id.
• 84 See MCCAR'ill•, SI/pro note 9, 24:89. '
85
 See 15 U.S.C, §1125(c.)(1). 	 ,
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because "famous" is a term that "lacks any technical meaning in
United States trademark law."86
 Several courts have held trademarks
to be famous without explanation of their reasoning or analysis of the
statutory fame factors.87 Other courts have applied at least some of
the faille factors in deciding that a mark was famous. 88 Trademarks
that have been found to be famous include NBA, 89 FEDERAL EX-
PRESS 9° TOYS 'R' US,91 THE SPORTING NEWS,92 JEWS FOR JE-
SUS,93 EBONY,94 HOTMAIL,95 WAWA,96 PANAVISION,97 ARTHUR,98
BARBIE,99 PLAYBOY,'°° ERA, 1°1 COACH, 1°2 PORSCHE, 1°3 and POST-
ITIO4
Several courts have rejected claims under the FTDA on the
ground that the plaintiff's trademark was not famous. 105 Trademarks
88 See Klieger, supra note 1 at 842.
87 See, e.g., Sara Lee Corp, v. American Leather Prod., Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11914, at 32-33 (N.D. Ill. 1998) ("with [the statutory] factors in mind, this court concludes
that Sara Lee's registered trademark COACH leather hang tag ... is a famous mark");
Mattel, Inc. v. JCOM, Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16195, at 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (the doll .
BARBIE is famous "by any measure"); Playboy Enter. v. Asiarocus Intl, Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10359, at 20 (E.D. Va. 1998) ("The fame of [the] PLAYMATE and PLAYBOY marks
cannot reasonably be disputed").
88 See, e.g., NBA Prop. v. Untertainment Records LLC, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7780, at
20 (S.D.N.Y 1999) (NBA); Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2832, at 13-14 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (THE SPORTING NEWS); Jews for Jesus v.
Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 306 (D.NJ. 1998) ( JEWS FOR JESUS).
89 NBA, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7780, at 20.
99
 Fed. Express Corp. v. Federal Espresso, Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15607, at 57-58
(N.D.N.Y 1998).
91
 Eli Abin 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22431 at 13.
92 Times Mirror; 1999 U.S. Dist, LEXIS 2832 at'13-14.
"Jews foriesus, 993 F. Supp. at 306.
94 Johnson Pubfg Co., Inc. v. Willitts Designs Intl, Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9264, at
22 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
Hotmail Corp. v. Van Money Pie Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10729, at 15 (N.D. Cal.
1998).
98 WAWA, Inc. v. Haaf, 1996 U.S. Dist, LEXIS 11494, at 5 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
97 Panavision Intl, L.P. v. TOeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1302-03 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
98 Brown v. It's Entin't, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 854, 859 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
99 Mallet, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16195, at 9.
"'Playboy, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10359, at 20.
1 ° 1 ERA, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15916, at I I.
102 Sorg Lee, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11914, at 32-33.
102 Porsche, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 802.
I" Minn. Mining and Mfg. v. Taylor, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1005 (D. Minn. 1998).
1115 See, e.g., Alltel Corp. v. Actel Integ. Communications, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1273
(S.D. Ala. 1999); Conopco, Inc. v. Cosntair, Inc., 49 F. Stipp. 2d 242, 246, 258 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) ("squat, rectangular, glass [perfume] bottle with straight edges"); Wash. Speakers
Bur., Inc. v. Leading Anth„ Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 488, 504 (E.D. Va. 1999) (WASHINGTON
SPEAKERS BUREAU).
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held not to be famous under the federal dilution statute include
LANE (financial services), 108 CIT GROUP,'" WASHINGTON SPEAK-
ERS BUREAU, 108 AUTHORITY ("The Sports Authority"), 109
WEATHER GUARD, 11° STEALTH (computer equipment), 111 KING
OF THE MOUNTAIN SPORTS,'" ALLTEL, 113
 BONGO (junior
women's apparel), 114 APPLESEED ("The Appleseed Foundatio ► "), 118
WE'LL TAKE GOOD CARE OF YOU (drug store slogan), 116 STAR
MARKETS (grocery stores), 117 a "squat, rectangular, glass [perfume]
bottle with straight edges," 118 and certain "humanized skeleton char-
acters."11 °
Two federal appeals courts have read the famousness require-
ment as limiting the FTDA to a narrow, elite category of trade-
marks.'" In 1999, in Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton., the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the tradeniarks AVERY and DENNISON
(for office products) were not famous, and therefore were ineligible
for FTDA protection."' The court read the fame requirement as limit-
ing the dilution cause of action to "a select class of marks" that have
"such powerful consumer associations that even non-competing uses
can impinge on their value."122 The court explained that if dilution
protection were available "on a showing of inherent or acquired dis-
tinctiveness" that fell short of genuine fame, "we would upset the bal-
ance [of American trademark law] in favor of over-protecting trade-
marks, at the expense of potential non-infringing uses." 123
tor' Lane Capital Mgmt., Inc. v. Lane Capital Mgml., Inc.., 15 F. Stipp. 2d 389, 40(1
(S.D.N.V. 1998).
1 °7 err Group v. Citicorp, 20 F. Supp. 2d 775. 794 (DN.J. 1998).
ISO Washington Speakers Bur, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 503-04.
1 °9 Sports Atah, V. Abercrombie & Fitch, Inc., 965 F Stipp. 925, 941 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
10 Knaack Mfg. Co. v. Rally Accessories, Inc., 955 F. Stipp. 991, 1005 (N.D. III. 1997).
In S. Indus. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 991 F. Stipp. 1012 at 1021-22 (N.D. III. 1998).
112 King of the Mountain Sports, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 908 F. Stipp. 568, 577 (D. Col.
1997).
113 Alhel, 42 F. Stipp. 2(1 al 1273.
Michael Caruso, inc. v. Estefan Enters., 994 F. Stipp. 1454, 1463 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
115 Appleseed Found., 981 F. Stipp. at 677.
116 Genovese Drug- Stores, 939 F. Supp. at 350.
117 .Star Markets, 950 F. Stipp. at 1036.
118 COMPCO, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 246.
119 Scholastic Inc, v. Speirs, 28 F. Supp. 2d 862, 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
120 See infra notes 121-127 and accompanying text.
121 See 189 F.3(1 808, 877 (9th Cir. 1999).
122 SFr. id. at 875.
1 " See id.
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In 1998, in I.P. Lund Trading Aps, Kronin Inc. v. Kohler Co., the
First Circuit Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff's VOLA faucet
design was not famons. 124 The court set a "heightened fame stan-
dard," reading the legislative history to indicate that Congress under-
stood the FTDA to be an "extraordinary remedy" for "very unique
marks." 125 The First Circuit cited the House Report's examples of
DUPONT, BUICK and KODAK as evidence of the magnitude of the
fame Congress had in mind. 126 Although the court concluded that the
language of the FTDA is not limited to these "archetypal problems" in
which a "world-fatuous brand name" has been diluted, it required evi-
dence that the heightened fame standard has been met."' Other
courts, however, have held marks such as EBONY, 128 HOTMAIL,12g
WAWA,'" PANAVISION, 131 and ARTHUR132 to be famous, with no
indication that a heightened standard has been applied.
Under state and federal dilution law, courts have recognized two
kinds of dilution: blurring and tarnishment. 03 The FTDA's definition
12 '1 163 F.3d 27, 47 (1st Cir. 1998).
122 IP Lund, 163 F.3d al 47 (citations omitted); see also Lane crowd, 15 F. Supp. at 400
("Few marks are ever famoiis").
126 I.P. Lund, 163 E3d at 45; H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 3. Sonic courts have used these
and similar examples as a yardstick for measuring fame. See Michael Caruso, 994 F. Stipp. at
1463 ("while 'Bongo' may be a distinctive mark in the junior women's apparel market, it is
not a generally famous mark like 'Exxon' and 'Kodak'"); Knaach, 955 F. Supp. at 1003
(WEATHER GUARD does not have the "widespread fame and celebrity" of "marks such as
Coca-Cola, Polaroid, Disney, Kodak or Rolls Royce"); Golden Bear Intl, Inc. v. BEAR
U.S.A., Inc., 969 F. Stipp. 742, 749 (N.D. Ga. 1996) ("Golden Bear" not famous like
EXXON, KODAK, or COCA COLA).
127 LP Lund, 163 F.3d at 45. The court suggests that consumers surveys could be used
as evidence of fame. Id. II notes that "although some marks, such as COCA-COLA, may be
so famous as to be judicially noticed ... the VOLA faucet is far from being a candidate for
such judicial notice." Id. at 47.
1211 Johnson Publ'g, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9264, at 306.
129 Hobnail, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10729, at 15.
IITAIVA, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11494, at 5.
131 Panavision, 945 F. Supp. at 1302-03.
132 BrOWn, 34 F. Sum. 2d at 859.
133 See, e.g., Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 217-22 (2c1 Cir. 1999) (blue-
ring);Ain. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prod., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 733 (D. Minn.
1998) (tarnishment). What is perhaps the newest form of dilution, the use of another's
trademark as an Internet domain name. has in some instances been conceptualUed tinder
the blurring or tarnishment headings. See, e.g., Jews for Jesus, 993 F. Stipp. at 307 (defen-
dant's use of plaintiff's mark "to hire individuals to his Internet site where he makes dis-
paraging statements about the Plaintiff Organization" held to constitute blurring and I ar-
nishinent of the mark). Other courts, however, recognize a third category of dilution. See,
e.g., Panavision, l41 F.3d at 1326 Mil concluding that [defendant's] use of [plaintiff's'
trademarks diluted the marks, the district court noted that [defendant's] conduct varied
from the two standard dilution theories of blurring and tarnishmeni.... The court found
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of dilution—"the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to iden-
tify and distinguish goods or services"—describes blurring, but the
legislative history indicates a congressional intent for the FTDA to en-
compass both of the forms of trademark dilution that had been rec-
ognized under state law. 134
 The Second Circuit has explained that
"Narnishment generally arises when the plaintiff's trademark ... is
portrayed in an unwholesome or unsavory context likely to evoke
unflattering thoughts about the owner's product. In such situations,
the trademark's reputation and commercial value might he dimin-
ished , ."135 For example, in Archdiocese of St. Louis v. Internet Enter-
tainment Group, Inc., the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri held that the plaintiffs PAPAL VISIT 1999 mark
had been tarnished by the defendant's placement of pornographic
materials at the PAPALVISIT.COM
 address on the World Wide Web 136
Tarnishment is a relatively straightforward tort, and courts have not
found it difficult to apply the FTDA in tarnishment cases.'"
Blurring, however, is a more obscure phenomenon. The Restate-
ment notes the nebulous character of blurring: "Direct evidence of a
dilution of distinctiveness is seldom available because the harm at is-
sue is a blurring of the mental associations evoked by the mark, a
phenomenon not easily sampled by consumer surveys and not nor-
mally manifested by unambiguous consumer behavior."" 8 Other
commentators have described dilution by blurring as "a theory that
no one understands" 39
 and as "bewilderingly intangible." 140 The
that [defendant's] conduct dintinished "the capacity of the [plaintiff's] marks to identify
and distinguish [plaint ifrs] goods and services on the Interne)").,
131 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994 & Supp. 1996). The House Report indicates that the Fr DA
"is designed to protect fatuous trademarks l'rona subsequent uses that hl or the distinctive-
ness of the mark or tarnish or disparage it ...." ILR. REP. No. 109-374 at 2 (1995).
In Deere & Co. v. M'I'D Products, Inc. 41 F.3c1 39.43 (2d Cir. 1994).
1 " '34 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1146 (E.D. Mo. 1999).
137 See Oswald, supra note 73. at 279. Oswald concludes Ihat "Whe determination of
whether a junior mark places a senior mark in an unwholesome or unsavory light is neces-
sarily heavily fact-dependent, The subjective evaluations engaged in by courts, whether
they are applying state statutes or the federal Act, work well in this context." Id,
158 RESTATEMENT, Sifpra note 64, § 25 cmt. f.; see asoionathan E. Moskin, Dilution or De-
lusion: The Rational Limits of Trademark Protection, 83 TRADEMARK Rio'. 122. 138 (1993)
("['1'] he dilution concept supposes only a gradual dissipation or deterioration of good will,
not its sudden disappearance or destruction.... Vet how is a witness to detect this gradual
mental process or for that matter, how is such a witness to be located?").
1 " See Moskin, supra note 138, at 125.
140 Note, Dilution; 'fladernark Infringement or Will-O-The-Wiv, 77 11ARV, Is . REv. 520, 528
(1964).
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Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has characterized it as a "dauntingly
elusive concept."141
Despite these concerns, many courts have accepted circumstan-
tial proof of dilution under the FTDA.142 The test most often used has
been the six-factor test Judge Sweet set out in his concurring opinion
in Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., a 1989 case
decided under the New York dilution statute. 143 Judge Sweet's factors
are: (1) similarity of the marks; (2) similarity of the products covered
by the marks; (3) sophistication of consumers; (4) predatory intent;
(5) renown of the senior mark; and (6) renown of the junior mark."4
The first, second, fourth, fifth and sixth factors are positively corre-
lated with dilution, while the third is negatively correlated with dilu-
tion."5 Several courts have used the Mead Data test to analyze diluting
by blurring, some finding dilution, 146 others rejecting dilution
claims. 147 Other courts have upheld'48 or rejected 149 claims of dilution
by blurring without using the Mead Data test.
Despite its widespread use, the Mead Data test has come under
fire in recent decisions. 159 In Lund, the First Circuit criticized Mead
111 See Ringling, 170 F.3d at 451.
142 See, e.g., infra note 145 and accompanying text.
143 875 F.2(1 1026, 1035 (2d Cir. 1089).
H.' Id.
145 See Hershey Foods Corp. v. Mars, Inc., 998 F. Stipp. 500, 504 (M.D. Pa. 1998).
14° See, e.g., Times Mirror Magazines, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2832 at 17-19; Consol. Cigar
Corp. v. Monte Cristi de "[abacus, 58 F. Stipp. 2d 188, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Lexington
Mgmt. Corp. v. Lexington Capital Partners, 10 F. Stipp. 2d 271, 289-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1998);
Clinique Lab., Inc. v. DEP Corp., 045 F. Supp. 547, 562-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); WAWA, 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11494, at 8.
147 See, e.g., Allichael Caruso, 994 F. Supp. at 1463-64; Fed. Express, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15607 at 59-65; Hartz & Co., Inc. v. Italia, Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3716, at 6 (S.D.N.Y.
1998); Ringling Bros.-Barnusn & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E. Windows Corp., 937
F. Supp. 204, 211-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
' 8 See, e.g., Brown, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 859; Liquid Glass Enter., Inc. v. Dr. Ing., 8 F.
Stipp. 2d 398, 405 (D.N.J. 1998); ERA Franchise. Sys. v. Logan & Logan Assocs., 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15916, at 11 (ED. Pa. 1998); Danjaq, LLC v. Sony Corp., 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22231 (C.D. Cal. 1998); Asiafocus, 1998 LEXIS 10359, at 20-21; Porsche Cars North
Am,, Inc. v. Manny's Porshop, Inc., 972 F. Stipp. 1128, 1132 (N.D. III. 1996); Minn. Mining,
21 F. Stipp. 2d at 1005.
149 See, e.g., Luigino's, Inc. v. Stouffer Corp., 170 F.3d 827, 833 (8th Cir. 1999); Playboy
Enter., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (CD. Cal. 1999);
World Gym Licensing, Ltd. v. Fitness World, Inc., 47 F. Stipp. 2d 614 (D. Md. 1999); crr
Group, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 794; Toys 'R' Us, Inc. v. Feinberg, 26 F. Supp. 2d 639 (S.D.N.Y
1998).
15° See I.P. Lund, 163 F.3d at 40; see also Ringling, 170 F.3d at 464 ("the Mead-factor
analysis simply is not appropriate for assessing a claim under the federal Act"); Nabisco, 191
F.3d at 227 ("it would be a serious mistake at the outset of our consideration of the new
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Data "for introducing factors that are the offspring of classical likeli-
hood of confusion analysis and are not particularly relevant or helpful
in resolving the issues of dilution by blurring." 151
 The court pointed
out that weighing the similarity of the products (factor two) in the
blurring analysis "May work directly contrary to the intent of a law
whose primary purpose was to apply in cases of widely differing goods,
i.e. Kodak pianos and Kodak film."152
 The First Circuit also found
predatory intent (factor four) irrelevant, reasoning that "blurting oc-
curs in the minds of potential customers. Predatory intent (of the jun-
ior user] tells little about how customers in fact perceive products."'"
Judge Sweet assumed that the greater the renown of the senior
mark (factor five), the greater the likelihood that the junior mark
would cause blurring in the minds of consumers. 154
 But the court was
analyzing dilution under the New York dilution statute, which does
not include the FTDA's requirement that the senior mark be fa-
mous. 155
 Because the FTDA requires fame, factor five of the Mead Data
test is superfluous. 156
The trend in the cases has been toward the rejection of the Mead
Data test. 157
 Of those courts that have not used the Mead Data test,
some have simply made conclusory statements that the plaintiff's
mark has been diluted based on the identity or near-identity of the
two marks, with standard dilution boilerplate tossed in for empha-
federal antidilution statute to limit ourselves to these six factors . • .."); Oswald, supra note
73, at 284-95. But we Hershey, 998 F. Stipp. at 520 ("In our view, only the second facto• is
irrelevant.").
15L LP Lund, 163 F.3d at 49 (citation omitted).
1521d, (citation omitted); we (Its°, Oswald, .supra nine 73, at 289 ( -By including similarity
of the products as a factor in blurring analysis under the trrnA I. courts give weight to a
consideration the Act explicitly makes irrelevant.").
I"' LP. Lund, 163 F.3d at 49-50; see also, Clinique, 945 F. Stipp. at 562 11.22 (declining to
use factor four because Congress had not included a predatory intent requirement. in the
Frnm.
154 See Mead Data, 875 F.2d at 1038.
155 SeeN.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 368-d (McKinney 1996).
156 See Oswald. supra note 73, at 294. Courts are divided on the significance of con-
sumer-sophistication (factor three). Some courts have adopted judge Sweet's premise that
less sophisticated consumers are more inclined to mistakenly associate unrelated marks.
See 1996 U.S. Dist, LEXIS 11494, at 9; 13,11, Windows, 937 F. Stipp. at 213. The Her,
spry court, however, advanced the opposite interpretation, reasoning that "the inure so-
phisticated the consumers the more likely they will recognize dint the mark has become
associated with separate sources." See Herslutv, 998 F. Stipp. al 521. For a critique of factor 6
(renown of the junior mark), see Clinique, 945 F. Stipp. at 563 (arguing that factor 6 always
weighs in favor of the junior user because the junior mark is never famous).
157 See, e.g., I.P. Lund, 170 F.3d at 49-50; Ringling, 170 F.3d at 464; Nabisco, 191 F.3d at
227.
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sis. 158 The Second Circuit has outlined its own multi-factor test for
trademark dilution)" The Fourth Circuit, however, has rejected the
circumstantial approach to proving dilution altogether, and has re-
quired evidence of an actual reduction in the selling power of the sen-
ior mark before granting FTDA relief.'" The Second and Fourth Cir-
cuits have thus framed the essential question for courts deciding cases
under the FTDA. Does the statute require evidence of actual dilution,
an actual lessening of the senior mark's capacity to identify and dis-
tinguish goods and services?lo Or is circumstantial evidence of a less-
ening of that capacity enough to prove a violation? 162
IV. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S RINGLING DECISION
In 1998, in Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v.
Utah Division of Travel Development, the Fourth Circuit rejected Rin-
gling's claim that its THE GREATEST SHOW ON EARTH mark had
been diluted by the State of Utah's THE GREATEST SNOW ON
EARTH mark.'" The court reasoned that Ringling had failed to offer
evidence that the State of Utah had caused actual dilution of the sell-
ing power of its mark)" In explaining its decision to require proof of
actual dilution, going beyond the circumstantial evidence other
courts have found convincing, the Fourth Circuit pointed out that
while state dilution statutes require just a "likelihood of dilution,"165
the text of the FTDA—which requires that the defendant's mark
138 See, e.g., Brown, 34 F. Snpp. at 859 ("Should unauthorized Arthur impersonators
proliferate, ... , the image sought by the plaintiffs for Arthur will be difficult to control
and might easily become blurred or tarnished."); Minn. Mining, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 1005
(holding defendant's registration, use, and attempted sale of domain names -post-it.com,"
"post-its.com ," and "ipost-it.cont" likely to dilute distinctive quality of famous POST-IT
mark); Liquid Glass, 8 F. Stipp. 2d at 405 ("Liquid Glass's unauthorized use of Porsche's
trademarks and trade dress is likely to slowly whittle away the distinctiveness of Porsche's
marks, demeaning the Porsche cachet and blurring the value of its famous and strong
marks"); Asiafoeus, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10359. at 20 ("It is clear that the capacity of
(plaintiff] to identify its goods and services was diminished").
159 See infra notes 199-203 and accompanying text.
L"" See Ringling; 170 F.3d at 458; see also World Gym, 47 F. Stipp. 26 at 625 ("proof of ac-
tual dilution caused by the junior mark is required and will not simply be inferred from
the bet that there has been proof of harm only to the mark's distinctiveness").
161 See Ringling, 170 F.3d at 458.
162 See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 223-24.
163 See 170 F.3d 449, 463 (4th Cir. 1999).
164 See id. at 462-63.
165 See, e.g., NY GEN. Bus. L ►w § 368-6 (2000) ("Likelihood of ... dilution of the dis-
tinctive quality of a mark ... shall be a ground For injunctive relief").
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causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the plaintiffs mark—limits
the FTDA to "actual, consummated dilution." 166
The Ringling court begins its analysis with Schechter's original
proposition—out of which dilution law emerged—that the "unique-
ness" of a trademark deserves legal protection. 167
 This would mean
that dilution could be proved with "any junior use of an identical or
sufficiently similar mark, without regard to whether the junior use
had any other harmful effect [on the senior mark] than its necessary
destruction of the senior mark's former absolute 'uniqueness: 1168
The court criticized this "radical" proposal on the ground that its ef-
fect would be to create property rights in gross in trademarks, rights
that would be similar to those copyright and patent law protect, but
superior because they would be unlimited in time. 169
 Under such a
scheme, "no proof would be required to prove dilution except the fact
that a junior mark replicated the protected mark."1"
The Fourth Circuit identified the diminution of the senior
mark's selling power—as opposed to the mere loss of its uniqueness—
as the injury dilution law aims to prevent.'" The court explained that
"by specifically defining dilution as 'the lessening of the capacity of a
famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services,' the
[FTDA] makes plain what the state statutes arguably may not that the
end harm at which it is aimed is a mark's selling power, not its 'dis-
tinctiveness' as such." 72
 The court then observed that "[Ole real in-
terpretive problem has been with how harm to the senior mark's sell-
ing power resulting from the junior mark's use could be proved."175 It
rejected the method of simply presuming such harm from the identity
or near-identity of the marks, the effect of' which would be to create
property rights in gross, reasoning that actual economic harm cannot
m See Ringling, 170 F.3(1 at 458. See also, Eric A. Prager, Half a Century of Federal Trade-
math Thotection: The Lanham Act lions Fifty: The Federal Trademark Dilution Ad of 1995: Sub-
stantial Likelihood of Confirsion, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEoIA & ENT. L. J. 121, 131
(1996) ("Logically, a defendant's mark does not 'cause dilution' of a plaintiff's mark until
the plaintiff's mark has suffered actual dilution.")
167 See Ringling, 170 F.3(1 at 454.
168 1d. at 454.
169 See id. To understand the significance of a property-rights-in-gross interpretation,
note that under traditional trademark jurisprudence "I Ilrademark holders to not actttally
'own' the underlying mark at issue. but rather, only possess a right to exclude others from
using the mark in a manner that would confuse consumers." See Port, sepia 110Ie 15, at 438.
17° Ringling, 170 F.34 at 456.
171 Id.
172 /d. at 458.
177 Id. at 457.
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he presumed based solely on a replicating or near-replicating junior
use: "[i]ndeed, common sense suggests that an occasional replicating
use might even enhance a senior mark's `magnetisin'—by drawing
renewed attention to it as a mark of unshakable eminence worthy of
emulation by an unthreatening non-competitor." 74 The mere replica-
tion or near-replication of an established mark, therefore, should not
be grounds for a presumption of dilution. 175
The Ringling court also rejected the Mead Data test and its prem-
ise that dilution could be proved via "the normal judicial process of
fact-finding by inference from a set of contextual factors," but the
court's reasoning differs from that of the First Circuit Court of Ap-
peals and other courts that have criticized Mead Data.176 Although the
Ringling court noted that the Mead Data test "has obvious utility in
making the long leaps of inference that can be used to find a mere
'likelihood of dilution,'" it declared that "inferring actual harm and
effective causation from such factors as 'consumer sophistication,'
and 'predatory intent' is a chancy process at best." 77 In contrast to
the suggestion of other courts that some of the Mead Data factors are
simply not relevant to the concept of trademark dilution,r 8 the Rin-
gling court argued that whatever their relevance to a . showing of a like-
lihood of dilution, the "long leaps of inference" the test requires courts
to make are not enough to establish actual dilution. 179
What the Ringling court settled upon is a requirement of proof of
"an actual lessening of the senior mark's selling power."180 It inter-
preted the FTDA as requiring: "(1) a sufficient similarity between the
junior and senior marks to evoke an instinctive mental association of
the two by a relevant universe of consumers which is the effective
cause of (3) an actual lessening of the senior mark's selling power."tel
While granting that "[t]his ... is a stringent interpretation" of the
statute, the Ringling court noted that "given the critical provisions that
essentially differentiate the [FTDA] on key points from the state stat-
utes, we must assume that this was exactly what was intended by Con-
174 hi. at 460; see alwMoskin, supra note 138, at 135 ("The junior use may ... be a kind
of free advertising").
179 Ringling, 170 F.3d at 460.
176 See id. at 457;1.E Lund Trading ApS, Kronin Inc. v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 47 (1st
Cir. 1098).
177 Ringling, 170 F.3d at 464.
178 See suinv notes 150-157 and accompanying text.
179 See Ringling, 170 F.3(1 at 464.
18° Id. at 458.
181 hi.
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gress."182
 In rejecting the plaintiff's argument that the FTDA just re-
quires proof that the junior and senior marks are similar, the court
declared its disbelief that "Congress could have intended, without
making its intention to do so perfectly clear, to create property rights
in gross, unlimited in time (via injunction), even in "famous" trade-
marks. Had that been the intention, it is one easily and simply ex-
pressed by merely proscribing use of any substantially replicating jun-
ior mark."183
 On the contrary, the FTDA requires "specific harm to
the senior mark's economic value in the form of a 'lessening of [its]
capacity . . . to identify and distinguish goods and services." 184
The court acknowledged the difficulties entailed in proving ac-
tual dilution, and suggested that this "may have led a few federal
courts early on simply to assume, without facing up to the interpretive
difficulty of doing so, that the [FTDA] only requires proof of a 'likeli-
hood of dilution."85
 The court rejected, however, the notion that
proof of actual dilution is "impossible and therefore not ... what
Congress could have intended." 186
 It concluded that "[p]roof will be
difficult, because actual, consummated dilutive harm and its cause are
difficult concepts. But the concept is a substantively viable one, and
the means of proof are available." 187
 The court suggested three poten-
tial methods of proving actual dilution under the FTDA: (1) "proof of
an actual loss of revenues, and proof of [the junior mark] as cause by
disproving other possible causes"; (2) "the skillfully constructed con-
sumer survey designed not just to demonstrate 'mental association' of
the marks in isolation, but further consumer impressions from which
actual harm and cause might rationally be inferred"; and (3) "rele-
vant contextual factors such as the extent of the junior mark's expo-
' sure, the similarity of the marks, [and] the firmness of the senior
mark's hold," which the court indicates are relevant "as indirect evi-
dence that might complement other proof." 188
On the facts before it, the court held that the survey evidence the
plaintiff had introduced failed to show that "Utah's junior mark had
caused any actual harm to Ringling's mark in the form of a lessening
of [its] former capacity to identify and distinguish Ringling's circus as
182 Id, at 458-59.
183 Id. at 459.
184 Ringling, 170 F.3(1 at 459.
182 /d. at 464.
186 id.
187 Id.
188 14. at 465.
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its subject."189 On the contrary, the evidence included "survey results
indicating that consumer familiarity with Ringling's mark was greater
in Utah (46%), where Utah's mark was well-known, than in the rest of
the country (41%), where Utah's mark was virtually unknown," and
that "virtually every" respondent associated Ringling's mark with the
circus and not with Utah's winter sports. 19°
V. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S NABISCO DECISION
In 1999, in Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., the Second Circuit ex-
pressly rejected the Fourth Circuit's approach. 191 At issue in this case
were "orange, bite-sized, cheddar cheese-flavored, goldfish-shaped
cracker [s] ."192 Pepperidge Farm, which had sold such crackers since
1962, claimed that Nabisco's CatDog snack—made up of small orange
crackers in three shapes, based on the CatDog cartoon program, one
of which "closely resembles Pepperidge Farm's Goldfish cracker in
color, shape, ... size, and taste"—would dilute the distinctive quality
of its GOLDFISH mark)" Pepperidge Farm prevailed on its dilution
claim, but without the showing of actual dilution the Fourth Circuit
requires. 194
In rejecting the Fourth Circuit's approach, the Nabisco court de-
scribed the requirement that actual loss of revenues be demonstrated
as "inappropriate," reasoning that "[i] f the famous senior mark were
being exploited with continually growing success, the senior user
might never be able to show diminished revenues, no matter how ob-
vious it was that the junior use diluted the distinctiveness of the sen-
ior."195 The court argued further that "[e]ven if diminished revenue
could be shown, it would be extraordinarily speculative and difficult
to prove that the loss was due to the dilution of the mark." 96 The
court dismissed consumer surveys as "expensive, time-consuming, and
189 Ringling, 170 F.3c1 at 463.
I" kJ.
191 191 F.3(1 208,223-25 (2d Cir. 1999).
152 See id. at 212.
1" See id. at 213. One quarter of the crackers in each package were fish, the favorite
food and symbol of the cat half of the CatDog character. Id. One quarter were bones, the
favorite food and symbol of the dog half. Id. The other half of the crackers were in the
shape of the CatDog character itself. Id. The court noted that the Nabisco fish was "some-
what larger and flatter" and had "markings on one side." Id.
194 See id. at 222.
195 Id. at 223-24.
196 Id. at 224.
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not immune to manipulation." 197
 In contrast to the Fourth Circuit's
requirement that actual dilution be established, the court concluded
that plaintiffs should be "free to make their case through circumstan-
tial evidence that will justify an ultimate inference of injury." 198
In that spirit, the Nabisco court adopted what it called "a cautious
and gradual approach," which entails the selective use of factors
found in its infringement jurisprudence that seem helpful in the dilu-
tion context on the facts of the specific case. 199
 The factors the court
deemed relevant to the facts before it were (a) distinctiveness; (b)
similarity of the marks; (c) proximity of the products and likelihood
of bridging the gap; (d) interrelationship among (a), (b) and (c); (e)
shared consumers and geographic limitations; (f) sophistication of
consumers; (g) actual confusion; (h) adjectival or referential quality
of the junior use; (i) harm to the junior user and delay by the senior
user; and (j) effect of the plaintiff's prior laxity in protecting the
mark. 20°
Based on a weighing of these contextual factors—the court em-
phasized the reasonable distinctiveness of the GOLDFISH mark, 201
the close proximity of the products in the market, the similarity be-
tween the two goldfish crackers, 202
 the low level of consumer sophisti-
cation, and the punctuality of the litigation----the court sustained the
district court's decision to grant a preliminary injunction. 205 In declin-
ing to read an actual dilution requirement into the FTDA, as the
Fourth Circuit had clone, the Second Circuit joined other courts that
have read the FTDA to require just a likelihood of dilution established




 Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 217.
200 Id. at 217-22.
201 Id. at 222. "Rilecanse the	 , goldfish shape has no logical relationship to a bite-
sized cheese cracker ... we believe that Pepperidge Farm's senior mark is reasonably dis-
tinctive." Id. at 218.
2°2 Id. "Boils fish are presented arbitrarily in the form of a cracker. Notwithstanding
slight differences in shape, si7Ae and marking, klie1 (rackets are essetnially the same color,
shape, size, and taste." Id. at 218.
2011 Id. at 222.
204
 See, e.g., Consol. Cigar Corp. v. Monte Cristi de Tabacos, 58 F. Stipp. 2d 188, 200
(S.D.N.Y. 1999); Lexington Mgini. Corp. v, Lexington Capital Partners, 10 F. Stipp. 2d 271,
289-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
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VI. THE LOGIC OF AN ACTUAL DILUTION REQUIREMENT
Judicial uncertainty about the FTDA should be resolved, as it has
been in the Fourth Circuit, in favor of a narrow interpretation of the
statute. The natural reading of the statutory text—which speaks of a
junior trademark that causes dilution of the distinctive quality of an
established one—is that it requires proof of actual dilution. 205 If Con-
gress intended to require a mere likelihood of dilution, it had the
state dilution statutes before it as a model for writing such a law; the
failure of the drafters to include the same language in the FTDA sug-
gests that it was not the likelihood of dilution, but actual dilution it-
self, that Congress intended to proscribe. 2o6
In other regards, the text of the FTDA is nearly identical to the
Model State Trademark Bill, the language of which was imported into
many state dilution statutes. 207 Each creates a cause of action for "dilu-
tion of the distinctive quality of [the] mark." 208 The Model Bill applies
"notwithstanding the absence of competition between the parties or
the absence of confusion;" the FTDA applies "regardless of the .
absence of ... competition between the ... parties, or . . . likelihood
of confusion."2°9 These similarities are evidence that - Congress used
state dilution legislation as a model for the FTDA.21° In the Model
Bill, however, the phrase "likelihood of precedes and modifies the
word "dilution." 2 " Unless courts are to assume that Congress made an
error in drafting, the natural inference is that it intended not to create
a vague, open-ended "likelihood of dilution" cause of action and
omitted the phrase "likelihood of for that reason. 212
Moreover, when Congress defined the term "dilution" in the
FTDA, it used the phrase "likelihood of" to indicate what a dilution
cause of action does not require. 2 " Dilution is defined as the lessening
of a famous mark's capacity to distinguish goods and services, "regard-
less of the presence or absence of ... [a] likelihood of confusion, mis-
205 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1994 & Stipp. 1996).
21* See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text. But see McCarthy, supra note 9, 24:94
(FTDA does not require evidence of actual dilution).
207 See 15 U.S.C. 1125(c); Mom. STATE "fRADEMARK BILL 12 (U. S. Trademark Asso-




211 See MODEL STATE TRADEMARK BILL 12.
212 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
210 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994 & Stipp. 1996).
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take, or deception."2 t4
 The appearance of a "likelihood of' formula-
tion in the text of the FTDA itself further undermines the argument
that Congress intended to establish a "likelihood of dilution" standard
by implication. 215
 In drafting the FTDA, when Congress intended to
say "likelihood of X," it said just that; "causes dilution" should there-
fore not be read to mean "likelihood of dilution." 2 t6
If the Second Circuit's "likelihood of dilution" reading were to
prevail, dilution would inevitably .
 replace infringement as the basic
trademark cause of action. 217
 This is because dilution, which does not
require evidence of consumer confusion, would be much easier to
prove. 218
 The infringement cause of action would be unnecessary, as it
is difficult to imagine a junior mark likely to confuse consumers about
source and affiliation that would not also be held likely to dilute the
distinctive quality of the senior mark. 219
If the protection of established trademarks were an unmitigated
benefit to.the public, such an expansion in federal trademark protec-
tion might not be a cause for concern, 22° But trademark protection
beyond what is required to prevent consumer confusion does not ad-
vance the public interest, and in fact has potential harmful effects. 221
Established trademarks encourage consumers to purchase familiar
products and to ,reject new products bearing new marks. 222
 Estab-
lished trademarks therefore constitute barriers to the entry of new
products into the market, and the greater the protection established
trademarks receive, the higher these barriers are set. 225
 Because con-
sumer preferences for products bearing established trademarks are
often a function of advertising aimed at emotion rather than reason,
trademarks have the effect of keeping new products out of the market
on non-rational grounds. 224
Some market-barrier effect is inevitable if trademarks are to re-
ceive legal protection. But the infringement standard focuses on pre-
venting consumer confusion and strikes a balance between the need
214 See id. (emphasis added).
212 See id,
216 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(0 (1).





220 See Klieger, supra note 1. at 853-56.
221 See hl. at 856-60.
222 See hl.
223 See id.
224 See id, at 858-59.
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to protect consumers against confusing or deceptive trademarks, and
the public interest in market competition based on the objective
qualities of products, as opposed to their non-rational psychological
associations and brand personalities. 225 A trademark regime without a
consumer confusion standard—what the expansive reading of the
FTDA would create—threatens to upset the balance the consumer
confusion standard creates, thus giving established trademark holders
the power to enjoin the symbols of new enterprises for no discernible
public purpose. 226 If Congress intended such a momentous change in
American trademark law as the replacement of infringement as the
basic cause of action for trademark plaintiffs, one would expect it to
have been clear about what it was doing. But neither the text nor the
legislative history of the FTDA offer any indication that Congress in-
tended to displace the consumer confusion standard at the heart of
American trademark law. 227
The Nabisco court questioned the Ringling court's assertion that a
likelihood of dilution standard would have the effect of creating a
property right in gross, or a right to enjoin any substantially replicat-
ing mark.228 It argued that "there are many instances in which a junior
use of a famous mark might not reduce the capacity of that mark to
identify and distinguish products" under the FTDA. 229 But the test the
Nabisco court used—a 10-factor test so convoluted that one of the fac-
tors is the "interrelationship among" three other factors—does not
seem well designed to distinguish which junior uses have a diluting
effect and which do not. 230 Such an unwieldy 10-factor test could be
used in practice to justify whatever outcome the court prefers; it is
225
 See Klieger, supra note 1, at 853-56.
226 See id. at 863,
227 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c); H.R. REP. No. 104-374 (1995).
228
 See Nabisco, 191 F.Sd at 225 n.h.
229 Id. at 225 n.h.
23° See id. at 217-22. Oswald has criticized the trend toward "factorization" of trade-
ma•k law, noting that "the proliferation of [multi-factor] tests may encourage a court to
rotely run down a checklist, rather than considering carefully the claim of blurring in light
of the particular facts beibre it." See Oswald, sepia note 73, at 297. Oswakl's own reC0111-
in en dation is a "substantial similarity" test, tinder which, if two marks are "substantially
similar, a rebuttable presumption of blurring" kicks in. 11-1. at 298. The premise here is that
1w -there the junior and senior marks are substantially similar, the likelihood of blurring is
so overwhelming that it seems unfair to put the senior user to the task of proving dilution
affirmatively exists." Id. The burden would therefore shift to the juniori r user to rebut the
presumption of dilution, See id. But how does one rebut the presumption of something as
vague and amorphous as dilution? Why should the harden of dealing with its vagueness be
on defendants instead of plaintiffs?
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doubtful that it could draw consistent and reliable distinctions be-
tween diluting and non-diluting uses ,231
It is true that a likelihood of dilution standard would not necessar-
ily result in a regime of property rights in gross. But absent the actual
dilution requirement the Ringling court sees in the plain language of
the statute, courts would be free to enjoin substantially replicating
marks based on their own intuitive sense of what might cause dilu-
tion.232
 Perhaps not all substantially replicating marks would be pro-
hibited, but the rights of established trademark holders would be eli-
gible for a significant and unpredictable expansion. 233
 As one
commentator has put it, "[Allen a right is vague and impossible to
articulate, courts will always be inconsistent in their application of
that right."234
 Such would be the fate of the federal tight against dilu-
tion under the Second Circuit's interpretation. 235
The Nabisco court's acceptance of the likelihood of consumer
confusion as evidence of trademark dilution underscores the perva-
sive uncertainty about what exactly dilution statutes proscribe. The
Second Circuit wrote that "[a] junior use that confuses consumers as
to which mark is which surely dilutes the distinctiveness of the senior
mark."236
 The court noted that• consumer confusion is "unnecessary"
to the success of a dilution claim, but suggested that it would never-
theless be evidence of dilution. 237
 McCarthy's treatise, however, indi-
cates that dilution requires that the consumer recognize—free of con-
fusion—that one trademark is being used to identify two products:
"[t] he assumption [of the dilution cause of action] is that the relevant
public sees the junior user's use, and intuitively knows, because of the
context ... , that there is no connection between the owners of the
respective marks. "238
 A junior use of an established mark "can cause
confusion in some people's minds and in other people's minds cause
231 See Nabisco, 191 F.3d al 222. In a comment on the likelihood of confusion standard
of trademark infringement law that applies with even greater force to the likelihood of
dilution standard, Denicola holes that "trademark litigation frequently assumed a pecu-
liarly unreal aura, with judges vicariously wmidering supermarket aisles, and litigants pur-
porting to probe the subconscious of hypothetical consumers." Denirola, supra note 8, at
llil
252 See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 225 11.0; Ringling Bros. Barnum & Bailey Combined
Inc. v. Utah Div. of" Travel Dec., 170 F.3d 449,458-59 (4th Cir. 1999).
233 See kingling Bros., 170 F.3d at 458-59.
234
 Port, supra note 15, at 454.
235 See Nabisco, 191 F.3(.1 at 222.
236 hi. at 219.
257 See id.
238 MCCA RTHy, supra note 9, 24:70.
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" dilution by blurring. But in no people's minds can both perceptions
occur at the same time. Either a person thinks that the similarly
branded goods or services come from a common source (or are con-
nected or affiliated), or not."239 Consumer confusion, in other words,
is not evidence of dilution. 240
The FTDA, moreover, defines dilution as "the lessening of the
capacity 'of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or serv-
ices, regardless of the presence or absence of . .• . likelihood of confusion, mis-
take, or deception." 241 If Congress had intended consumer confusion
to be a factor that pointed toward a finding of dilution, it would have
made no sense to include in the definition of dilution an express dec-
laration of its irrelevance.M The Nabisco court's use of likelihood of
confusion evidence in -its dilution analysis points to the uncertainty
and confusion that would result if courts were to follow the Second
Circuit's expansive reading. 243 Because the harm the FTDA proscribes
is a vague and nebulous phenomenon, courts should avoid an expan-
sive reading of the statute that would open the door to such seemingly
erroneous interpretations.
The Nabisco court expressed concern that to require evidence of
actual dilution would leave the owners of established trademarks de-
fenseless against serious harms.244 Yet on the specific facts of the Na-
bisco case, there would seem to be ample evidence to support a trade-
mark infringement claim.245 Although the District Court had denied
Pepperidge Farm's infringement claim, for reasons the Court of Ap-
peals questioned,246 the Court of Appeals made repeated references
to consumer confusion in its discussion of diluition. 247 It noted that
many consumers of the Nabisco cracker would come upon the snack
independent of its packaging (for instance, served in a dish at a social
occasion), and might well confuse it with the Pepperidge Farm
cracker.248 The Court' of Appeals criticized the District Court for
counting the absence of evidence of actual consumer confusion
239 Id.
24° See id; see also RESTATEMENT, SUPra note 64, § 25, cmt f.
241 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994 & Stapp. 1996).
212 See id.
241 See Nabisco, 191 F.:Mat 218-221.
214 See id. at 224.
245 See id. at 218-21.
215 See id. at 228.
247 See id. at 218-21.
211 See Nabisco, 191 F.3(1 at 218 ("Infringement cases have consistently held post-sale
confusion as well as point-of-sale confusion to be actionable tinder the Lanham Act.")
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against Pepperidge Farm, 249
 and made clear its own view that con-
sumers would likely be confused. 250
 It is therefore hard to understand
the court's concern that an actual dilution requirement "would sub-
ject the senior user to unconipensable injury," for as the Court of Ap-
peals describes the facts and the law, an injunction could have been
issued on an infringement theory. 251
It is true that the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the statute
greatly limits its application, but it does not render the statute
moot. 252
 The Ringling court acknowledged that it would be a rare case
in which a junior mark could be proved to have been the cause of an
actual loss of revenues for an established mark. 253
 But the court sug-
gested a more promising avenue of proof: a plaintiff could demon-
strate an actual change in relevant consumer perceptions of its
trademark that would have the effect of reducing its selling power. 254
Although the concept of trademark dilution is extraordinarily
vague, if it has tangible meaning it must have something to do with a
reduction in an established trademark's brand equity or its typical-
4)7, 255
 "Brand equity" is the set of impressions consumers associate with
a brand: "[f]or example, the brand 'Black & Decker' immediately
triggers the image of rugged, loud, built-to-last power tools. . . On
the other hand, the brand 'Gerber' conjures images of baby food and
212 See id. at 228.
25° See id. at 218-21.
231 See id. at 224. Even if consumer confusion could not be demonstrated, and au in-
junction on an infringement theory was therefore unavailable, the Second Circuit is un-
convincing in its argument that, because the statutory remedy is injunctive relief, it would
be unfair to the owners of I unous trademarks to deny relief until after harm has been
sustained. See id. It Would seem equally, if not more, unfair to issue an injunction against a
defendant absent evidence that the defendant's conduct had in fact caused the injury
plaintiff alleged.
252
 See tingling Bros., 170 F.3d at 464; see also Patrick M. Bible, Defining and Quantifying
Dilution Under the Federal Rademath Dilution Act of 1995: Using Survey Evidence to Show Actual
Dilution, 70 U. Cow. L. Rev. 295, 314-35 (1999) (arguing that well-constructed surveys
can generate evidence of actual dilution); but see Beverly W. Panishall, Dawning Acceptance
of the Dilution Rationale for Trademark-Trade Identity Protection, 74 TRADEMARK REP. '289, 304-
05 (1984) ("Wile damage of dilution is peculiarly incorporeal, unlikely ever to prove sub-
ject to exact ascertainment, and even reasonable approximation probably will be
difficult"); Port, supra note 15, at 947 ("No mark has ever actually, quantitatively been es-
tablished to have been diluted").
253
 See tingling 170 E3d at 965. The Second Circuit emphasizes this point as a ground
Ibr rejecting the Fourth Circuit's reading of the VIDA. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 223-24.
254 See Rine ng, 170 F.3d at 405.
253
 See Bible, supra note 252, at 328-30; Alexander F. Simonscm. How and When Do
natlemarks Dilute: A Behavioral Framework to Judge "Likelihood" of Dilution, 83 TRADEMARK
REP. 149, 151-53 (1993).
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the wholesome, quiet, nurturing environment that surrounds new-
borns."256 "Typicality" is a brand's capacity to evoke a specific category
of product: BLACK DECKER should call to mind power tools, and
GERBER should call to mind baby food. 257
A reduction in brand equity could be used as evidence of dilu-
tion: "[M a junior party began to market Black & Decker baby foods
. , the Black & Decker mark's equity would begin to blur from
tough to tender and from durable to delicate." 258 So could a reduc-
tion in typicality, if, for example, the LEXIS mark caused consumers
to "think of both the computerized research service (LEXIS) and the
luxury automobile (LEXUS)."259 Surveys could be used to identify
and measure changes in these aspects of consumer perception. 26°
Three potential comparisons could be made. 261 First, there could
be a comparison between consumer perceptions before and after the
introduction of the defendant's mark. 262 Second, if the defendant op-
erates in a limited geographical area, the comparison could be be-
tween users inside and outside of the defendant's market. 263 Third, a
comparison could be made between consumers who are acquainted
with the defendant's mark and those who are not. 264 Evidence of a
reduction in the senior mark's typicality or its brand equity would
constitute tangible evidence that its capacity to identify and distin-
guish goods or services had been diluted. 265 Notwithstanding the
nebulous quality of the concept, if dilution has meaning—as courts
256 Bible, MOM note 252, at 328.
257 Sh11011S011, supra note 255, at 152-53 (citation omitted).
258 Bible, supra note 252, at 328.
259 !d. at 330.
266 See id. at 314-35. In WAWA, Inc. v. Haaf, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11494, at 5 (E.D. Pa.
1996), the court held for the plaintiff based in part on survey evidence indicating that a
substantial percentage of consumers associated the junior mark RAHA 24 HR MARKET
with the senior mark WAWA, which the plaintiff had used for its chain of convenience
stores. See 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11494, at 7-8.
261 See Bible, supra note 252, at 332.
262 See id. For this purpose, famous trademark holders should conduct periodic surveys,
so that liJn the event of litigation, they have a control survey which predates the entrance
into the market of the junior party's use of the mark." Id. Owners of "fatuous" trademarks
who are concerned about potential dilution should have no trouble bearing this cost. See
265 See Bible, supra note 252, at 332.
264 See hl. As the senior mark must be famous, and the junior mark is presumably new
to the market, there should he enough consumers who have heard of the senior mark but
not the junior mark to constitute a control group. See id.
265 Sec id.
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must assume it does—this is what it must be.266 There is no reason, in -
sum, why actual dilution could not be measured and proved in court.
CONCLUSION
Although it is possible to construct an empirical measure of
trademark dilution that is consistent with the statutory text, in the
end the vagueness of the concept is inescapable. Is .dilution a theory
that overlaps with infringement theory but expands its boundaries, as
the Sec.:Aid Circuit has held? 267
 Or is dilution a theoretically distinct
phenomenon that cannot coexist with confusion in the mind of the
consumer, as the leading academic authorities assert? 268 Or is it just
not possible to say what dilution is? 269
 If there are no definite answers
to these questions, and the statutory text points to a narrow reading
that minimizes the uncertainty and disruption the FTDA has the po-
tential to create, the narrow reading should prevail, absent a clear in-
dication—which we do not have—that Congress intended otherwise.
To return to the introductory example, if a new trademark on
the market is confusingly similar to MCDONALD'S, and is likely to
mislead consumers about the source and affiliation of the goods and
services it identifies, the goal of consumer protection justifies enjoin-
ing its use. 270 If there is proof that the new mark has caused an actual
reduction in the selling power of the MCDONALD'S mark, the FTDA
requires that it be enjoined. But absent evidence of a tangible injury
that goes beyond a mere diminution of uniqueness, neither the text
of the FTDA, the interest of the legal system in clear and predictable
rules, nor the scope and limits of the public interest in trademark law
support the granting of an injunction.
JONATHAN MERMIN
266 See id. Although his discussion of the use of survey evidence is sound, there is a
paradoxical wrinkle to Bible's own argument. See id. at 313. Bible tells us while au actual
dilution standard is appropriate in cases where a junior user has established itself in the
market, a likelihood of dilution standard should be used if a junior user's product has not
vet been CM the market for a substantial period of time. See id. If actual dilution is harder
to show than a likelihood of dilution, this means it would be easier for plaintiffs to block
speculative future harms than tangible present harms. See id. This seems illogical; an
across-the-board actual dilution requirement, consistent with the text of the statute, makes
more sense. See id.
267
 See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 218-21.
268 See MCCARTHY, supra note 9, 24:70; RESTATEMENT, supra note 64, § 25, elm. f.
269 See Port, supra note 15, at 454.
270 See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
